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By Donald N Zillman* 
The regulation of nuclear power in the United States provides ample 
opportunity for conflicts over jurisdiction. The Maine Yankee case 
demonstrates the complications that arise as a result. The article 
concludes, however, that state involvement in the federal process 
can be both useful and collaborative. 
Introduction 
The United States deserves much of the credit or blame for the crea­
tion of nuclear power. The atomic bomb projects of the 1940s and 
the nuclear navy of the 1950s gave rise to peaceful nuclear projects 
in the forms of massive electric generating facilities in the 1960s. A 
nuclear future seemed likely. 
Then a combination of circumstances stopped the nuclear electric 
programme. Cost-overruns, safety fears, unexpected downturns in 
the costs of competing fuels, rational and irrational popular opposi­
tion, the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents all helped dam­
age American nuclear development. By the late 1970s new orders 
for nuclear plants had stopped. By the mid-1990s the earliest of the 
existing plants were nearing the end of their licensed and physical 
lives. Newer plants were struggling with high costs. All operating 
plants were facing a new deregulated world of electric power sales 
in which companies could no longer rely on government-mandated 
paybacks of the cost of plant construction and operation. Nuclear 
HeinOnline -- 16 J. Energy Nat. Resources L. 16 1998
NucLEAR PowER REGULATION 
power shows ample signs of being a 'one generation and out' tech­
nology in the United States. 
Yet, a decade in energy policy can be an eternity. If we believe 
past predictions, we will soon have OPEC ruling the world, coal too 
dirty to burn, petroleum at over $100 per barrel, and solar energy 
beginning to dominate parts of the world's energy picture. A combi­
nation of factors could restore nuclear power to being the fuel of the 
future. 
For now, regulatory issues loom large in deciding the future of 
American nuclear power. Regulatory and promotional decisions by 
the United States government have kept nuclear power either cost 
advantageous or cost competitive with other energy sources. Regu­
lation has demanded safety, but has it been enough? No other energy 
source has a 'worst case accident' potential similar to nuclear power. 
1996 provided a troubling 12 months for American nuclear power. 
Several plants faced serious challenges to their continued existence. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal government's 
watchdog on nuclear safety, was criticised on its competence and 
integrity as a new Chairman, Shirley Jackson, tried to assert her au­
thority. Corporate owners struggled over whether to continue to sink 
dollars into nuclear technology. 
Many of these issues came into focus in the State of Maine, where 
the state's single nuclear plant, Maine Yankee, suffered through what 
could charitably be called a bad year. Its bad year troubled investors, 
management, nuclear supporters and opponents, and parts of state 
government, most notably Maine's Governor. This is the story of 
that year and following months. Our particular focus is on the posi­
tion of the State of Maine in nuclear regulation, a job typically the 
province of the private owners of the nuclear plant and the officials 
of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Maine Yankee 
The Maine Yankee nuclear power plant can be viewed as a product 
of American nuclear energy's golden age. It was planned in the 1960s 
when opposition to peaceful nuclear uses was sporadic. Licensing 
procedures were routine bureaucratic exercises. 
The plant was a single unit pressurised water reactor. It is located 
on an inlet of the Maine coast near Wiscasset, the self-proclaimed 
'prettiest village in Maine'. It is about 40 miles from Maine's largest 
city, Portland, which in turn, is about I 00 miles from the Boston 
metropolitan area. Maine Yankee is owned by a consortium of New 
England electric companies. The largest owner is Central Maine 
Power Company, Maine's largest electric utility. Half of Maine Yan­
kee is owned by Maine utilities; the other half by out-of-state com­
panies. Similarly, about half of Maine Yankee power stays in Maine 
where it supplies between 20-25 per cent of the state's electricity. 
The remaining power is shipped out of Maine, primarily to supply 
New England markets. The major owners make up most of the Board 
17 
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of Directors of Maine Yankee and appoint its Chief Executive Of­
ficer. 
Maine Yankee has characterised its first 22 years as highly suc­
cessful. The claim has merit. The plant was built on time and on 
budget. It earned a reputation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commis­
sion, that matched its name - frugal, a bit aloof, but competent. It 
also built a reputation for carrying out one of nuclear energy's great 
promises- generating large amounts of cheap energy. 
The major threat to Maine Yankee in these years was not financial 
or legal. It was political. Following the 1979 accident at Three Mile 
Island, two statewide referenda tried to close the plant by vote of the 
citizens of Maine. A third referenda was attempted in 1987 after the 
Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. Each vote failed. While the is­
sues differed and the Maine Yankee supporters substantially outspent 
their opponents, it seemed fair to conclude that a solid majority of 
Maine citizens backed a plant that appeared to offer inexpensive 
power under reasonably safe operating conditions. 
One of Maine Yankee's major involvements with federal regula­
tion and regulators was to ask for and get power increases allowing it 
to generate more total power at ever-cheaper unit costs. The NRC 
approved an increase to 2630 Mw,h in 1978 and a further increase to 
2700 Mw,h in 1989. Maine Yankee was generating the lowest cost 
power of any large generator in Maine. It had also positioned itself 
as the single New England nuclear plant whose costs allowed it to 
remain competitive if open competition came to the previously closed 
markets for electric power. But good news was about to become rare 
for Maine Yankee. 
Regulation of nuclear energy in the United States 
The law of United States nuclear electric generation can be summed 
up in a few paragraphs. These legal realities structured the relation­
ship among Maine Yankee, the United States, and the State of Maine 
during the 'time oftroubles' in 1995-97. 
After the success of the atomic bomb project and the end ofWorld 
War II in 1945, the United States Congress faced several crucial de­
cisions about nuclear energy. In retrospect, Congress may have erred, 
but it was decisive. First, Congress put control of the nuclear process 
in civilian, not military, hands. Second, in matters of nuclear secu­
rity and safety the federal government displaced the traditional role 
of the States as guardians of citizen's health and safety. Third, in 
1954 Congress authorised private industry to play the lead role in 
the development of peaceful uses of the atom. Congress, through 
federal agencies, would closely monitor security and radiation safety. 
But, private investors would build the nuclear plants and run them. 
Fourth, Congress took an unapologetic pro-nuclear stance. Govern­
ment did not merely allow nuclear technology. It encouraged it with 
large taxpayer subsidies to research and development and a pro­
nuclear regulatory posture. 
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These steps had built the world's largest nuclear industrial com­
munity by 1978 when Maine Yankee received its power upgrade to 
2630 Mw,h By that time, nuclear opponents were organising and turn­
ing any nuclear plant licensing into administrative law warfare with 
advocates on both sides finding little room for compromise. Nuclear 
opponents also began to raise 'state and local' issues. Why should 
the plant's neighbours take the risk of accidents? 
Federal law sided with the nuclear power industry. The Atomic 
Energy Act spoke of the goal of encouraging 'widespread participa­
tion in the development and utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common de­
fence and security and with the health and safety of the public ... ' 1 
The section of the Act addressing federal cooperation with the States 
recognised 'the need ... for cooperation between the States and the 
Commission with respect to control of radiation hazards associated 
with the use of[nuclear material],' and authorised Commission trans­
fer of jurisdiction to the States.2 However, the statute forbade the 
Commission from surrendering jurisdiction over 'the construction 
and operation of any production or utilisation facility', to wit, a nu­
clear electric plant.3 The States could, however, collaborate with a 
willing Commission in licensing and regulatory work. 
The major area for State autonomy (matters not needing a Com­
mission consent) was addressed in section 2021 (k): 'Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local 
agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against 
radiation hazards. ' 4 
The United States Supreme Court addressed sec 2021(k)'s alloca­
tion of jurisdiction in 1983 in Pacific Gas and Electric v Energy 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission. 5 The State 
of California enacted a statute in response to concern over the failure 
to find a long-term solution to the disposition of highly radioactive 
spent nuclear fuel. The statute imposed a moratorium on the certifi­
cation of new nuclear plants until the California Energy Commis­
sion certified that the United States had approved 'a demonstrated 
technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste'. 
The Energy Commission's finding was subject to disapproval by the 
California Legislature. 
California defended the statute against charges that it intruded on 
federal control of nuclear safety. California emphasised that it was 
concerned with the economics of nuclear technology (to which the 
cost of waste disposal was a substantial addition) rather than its safety 
from radiation hazards. The State also noted that the decision of its 
Energy Commission relied on the findings of the federal govern­
ment. Advocates of the nuclear industry and the United States agreed 
that California was engaged in an ill-disguised attempt to regulate 
nuclear safety issues, the responsibility of the United States. 
The Supreme Court, while recognising areas of federal nuclear 
supremacy, substantially favoured California's position. It thus gave 
state governments considerable ability to block nuclear development. 
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The Court noted that the federal-state regulation of nuclear power 
had 'not been simple' .6 The 1954 Amendments to the Atomic En­
ergy Act provided that the 'Federal Government should regulate the 
radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and opera­
tion of a nuclear plant, but that the states retain their traditional re­
sponsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determin­
ing questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related state con­
cerns' .7 
The Court noted that California could not 'regulate the construc­
tion of a nuclear powerplant'. 8 Even if non-radiation concerns moti­
vated the state, this would intrude on the power of the United States. 
So too, California could not demand that its nuclear safety concerns 
be satisfied by the United States as a condition of licensing Califor­
nia nuclear plants. Nuclear safety standards were the prerogative of 
the United States and not subject to a state demand for higher stand­
ards. 
California, however, had based its statute on economic, not safety 
reasons. Here, the United States Congress had not pre-empted state 
regulation either in section 2021 (k) or in subsequent regulation. 
While promotion of nuclear power is a goal of the Atomic Energy 
Act, that goal was not to be accomplished 'at all costs'. As the ma­
jority opinion concluded: ' ... the legal reality remains that Con­
gress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development 
of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic rea­
sons' .9 
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases reaffirmed the ability of 
state law to handle nuclear matters. Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp 
upheld a state tort law award of punitive damages for plutonium ex­
posure of a worker in a federally licensed nuclear facility. 10 English 
v General Electric upheld a state law claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress for retaliation against a nuclear facility 
whistleblower. 11 Here, the Court found too tenuous the connection 
between the harm to the worker (the goal of the state law) and the 
intrusion on federal control over nuclear safety. The Court insisted 
that the state laws need to have 'some direct and substantial effect on 
the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities 
concerning radiological safety levels' Y 
Lower federal court cases have followed the guidance of the Su­
preme Court. 13 State attempts to intrude on the federal prerogative in 
order to set nuclear safety standards have been struck down. How­
ever, states that avoid a safety confrontation have been able to assert 
their authority even where the state law proves to be a serious im­
pediment to nuclear operations. In brief, direct confrontation with 
the federal government is likely to prove unproductive for anti-nu­
clear states and local governments. But, through indirect means the 
states have considerable power over nuclear operations. In addition, 
nuclear decision-making combines law, economics, politics, and 
public relations. These factors would be important in the State of 
Maine's involvement with Maine Yankee. 
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Hard times for Maine Yankee 
Resleeving 
In July 1994, Maine Yankee discovered circumferential cracks in 
14 303 tubes in the plant's steam generator system. Four of the July 
1994 cracks had eaten more than 90 per cent of the way through the 
15 tube walls. The NRC had earlier cautioned plants about steam pipe 
16 cracks. The cracks threatened both tube efficiency and raised the 
prospect of radiation release if the tubes should breakY 
The Summer 1994 discoveries did not raise great alarm. The NRC 
estimated that serious deterioration was not likely for another three 
18 years. By March 1995, however, optimism faded. Continuing in­
spections by the plant and the NRC found more cracks and cracks of 
greater severity. The NRC on-site inspector admitted to 'great con­
cern' ! 9 The troubling question was whether the July 1994 inspec­
tions had not been adequate or whether the deterioration had accel­
erated at a far faster rate than expected. Neither was a cheering pros­
pect and at the end of March 1995, Maine Yankee was shut down for 
2an 'extended period' due to the tubing problem. ° Central Maine 
21 Power shares dropped 13 per cent in response to the bad news.
In early April the Maine Yankee Board began assessing some dif­
ficult options. Full replacement of the steam generators appeared to 
22 be a $150 million project. Repair, rather than replacement, was less 
expensive but still likely to cost $25 million. 
The extreme step was closure and the Board did address the pros­
pect.23 Newspaper reports made certain that every Maine Yankee 
worker knew that they faced the prospect of redundancy in the im­
24 mediate future.
Near the end of May 1995, the Maine Yankee Directors voted a 
$40 million repair project that involved inserting new metal s1eeving 
25 inside the cracked tubes. Westinghouse was awarded the repair con­
tract. 
In October 1995, as the repair project progressed, the Governor of 
26 Maine appointed a safety review panel. The panel consisted of the 
two state nuclear officers and three academic engineers from Texas 
A & M and the University of Southern Maine. By early December, 
the team was ready to give the repair project high marks. Maine 
Yankee's euphoric publicists observed: 'If it was a report card, it 
would be all As'.27 The repair project was on time and under budget 
28 and Maine Yankee appeared on its way to a renewed life.
Anonymous letter 
Trouble came from an unexpected direction in the form of an un­
signed, undated letter whose author described himself as a former 
worker at Yankee Atomic Energy Company, the supplier of engi­
neering services for Maine Yankee and other New England nuclear 
plants. The letter was sent to the Union of Concerned Scientists who 
on I December 1995, forwarded the letter to U1dis Vanags, Maine's 
21 
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Nuclear Safety Advisor. Vanags promptly sent the letter to the Nu­
clear Regulatory Commission. Within the week it was being reported 
in the press.29 
The anonymous whistleblower did not criticise the tube resleeving 
operation. His concern was the 1989 request to uprate Maine Yankee 
from 2630 to 2700 Mw,h. The letter stated that Maine Yankee and 
Yankee Atomic personnel had falsified safety information in order 
to secure the power upgrade. The primary focus was on deficiencies 
in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and in the computer 
code used to analyse a small break loss of coolant accident 
(SBLOCA). The accident at Three Mile Island had focused attention 
on the dangers of the core cooling system and the NRC had added 
new licensing standards to reflect lessons learned. 
The letter detailed Maine Yankee's attempt to perfect a computer 
code that would indicate satisfactory margins of safety in the case of 
an accident. The codes showed just the opposite, that the ECCS was 
'grossly inadequate'. Still Maine Yankee applied for the power uprate 
in part because the resident NRC inspector at Maine Yankee was 
about to be reassigned. The letter noted that the inspector 'was con­
sidered to be a particularly lenient person', therefore, Yankee Atomic 
wanted to get the approval before he left. Yankee Atomic also wanted 
to apply between Thanksgiving and Christmas when NRC staff were 
'least vigilant'. The uprate was approved. When the NRC subse­
quently insisted on verification of the functioning of the ECCS, Maine 
Yankee offered 'fraudulent models' which 'did not even analyse a 
realistic accident and/or Yankee Atomic scenario'. In consequence, 
the whistleblower concluded: 'Maine Yankee ... is operating on the 
basis of this fraudulent analysis at 2700 Mw,h'. The author summa­
rised with understated concern: 'I hope an occasion to use ECCS 
does not arise.' 
A further section of the letter addressed deficiencies in the reactor 
containment system. Once again, it was reported that YAEC fraudu­
lently excluded evidence that suggested an inadequate capacity to 
respond to a serious accident. What the letter called these 'tricks in 
the safety analysis' produced results that allowed the power upratings. 
Despite the frequent use of 'fraudulent' and references to 'fre­
quent violations of NRC regulations', 'ethical bankruptcy' and 'public 
safety concerns were put aside', the whistleblower was moderate in 
his suggested corrections. He asked that Maine Yankee be downrated 
to its original 2440 Mw,h capacity, that it and YAEC be fined, and 
that one manager 'who used these activities for self-promotion ... 
be seriously reprimanded'. 
The letter was also notable for its attitude toward the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. The author observed the growing view 
within Yankee Atomic, where he worked 'that NRC is a nuisance of 
an organisation and its staff technically incompetent'. The author's 
decision to share his concern with a public interest group rather than 
the NRC further suggested his concerns about NRC competence and 
openness. 
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The letter from the Union of Concerned Scientists endorsed the 
seriousness, if not the full credibility, of the charges. It recognised 
that the letter and accompanying documents indicated that a knowl­
edgeable insider was responsible for the release. It urged disclosure 
to the NRC 'and the citizens of Maine'. The UCS also called for the 
State of Maine to demand 'a thorough, factual investigation' for public 
review. The letter of transmittal concurred with the whistleblower's 
scepticism about the NRC. 'I am convinced, based on 26 years of
experience, that the NRC will not conduct such an investigation un­
less the State of Maine demands it.' 
Response to the letter varied. The NRC promised an investiga­
tion, noting 'we are taking it seriously' .30 Maine Yankee's public re­
lations director was dismissive: 'We don't feel there is any technical 
merit to these allegations'. 31 NRC investigators spent four days at 
Yankee Atomic interviewing staff and reviewing files. 32 While the 
safety issues involved were different, the popular perception was that 
the letter and its investigation could delay the Maine Yankee restart. 33 
The NRC investigation at Yankee Atomic discovered 'some legiti­
macy' in the letter.34 This was troubling news for Maine Yankee. 
Resumption of operation at 2700 Mw,h now became unlikely. 
As Christmas 1995 approached, the State of Maine appeared sat­
isfied that the NRC was doing its job.35 As a Portland Press Herald 
editorial put it after praising Maine Yankee's 23 year safety record, 
the NRC course 'serves both reason and caution' .36 The State's other 
leading paper, the Bangor Daily News was less charitable to both 
Maine Yankee and to NRC. 'The charges in the letter are clearly 
serious.' Maine Yankee 'has run on public trust ... but now that fuel 
may be in short supply' .37 Lastly, the NRC itself was under chal­
lenge from the whistleblower's allegation. 
By early 1996, it was clear that two separate, but inter-related, 
questions faced Maine Yankee, Yankee Atomic, the NRC and the 
State of Maine. First, was the whistleblower correct that criminal 
fraud had taken place in the 1989 approval of the power uprate? 
While Maine Yankee and Yankee Atomic had abandoned the compu­
ter code in question, 38 the prospect of prior criminal conduct posed 
an enormous problem. This was the stuff of melodrama conspiracy, 
conscious cooking the books in disregard of public safety. If the plant 
representatives were wilful, the NRC was only slightly better off. 
Their 1989 representatives appeared gullible. As the Governor asked 
about the on-site NRC inspector: 'What else did that guy miss?' 
The second issue was whether Maine Yankee of 1996 was safe to 
operate at 2700 Mw,h, at 2440 Mw,h or at all? That decision com­
bined an assessment of the resleeving with an assessment of any 
other deficiencies that had surfaced or would surface in the wake of 
the whistleblower's letter. 
At meetings in the second week of January, Governor King stated 
his position. At a meeting with Maine Yankee President Charlie Friz­
zle, he received assurances that the plant was safe to operate.·19 Ear­
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The Governor also received direct assurances from NRC senior offi­
cials that Maine Yankee was conclusively safe to operate at the lower 
2440 Mw,h. 
On 9 January, the Governor announced he would not oppose the 
restart of Maine Yankee. However, he characterised the anonymous 
letter as revealing a 'serious violation of the public trust'. He invited 
the author of this article 'to help him monitor the federal investiga­
tion into the letter's allegation'. 40 
Nuclear opponents were distressed. William Linnell, their most 
quoted spokesman, said the Governor had 'sold out' .41 The Bangor 
Daily News accurately summarised the Governor's powers: 'The gov­
ernor's legal authority to prevent the plant from starting on the NRC 
order is limited, but popular appeal allows him to influence the proc­
ess. He should rethink his decision ... and demand an independent 
investigation.'42 That view was countered by a Portland Press Her­
ald editorial that could have been written by Maine Yankee's Public 
Relations Office: 'Every action taken by Maine Yankee's managers 
and state and federal officials has been appropriate ... All concerned 
Mainers can have confidence that Maine Yankee is safe at the pro­
jected level of operation.'43 
By the end of January, Maine Yankee had returned to power pro­
duction at 2440 Mw,h Opponents continued to voice opposition to 
any operation of the plant and continued to emphasise the fraud in 
the 1989 uprating.44 They added their views that Maine Yankee's 
operation was unnecessary. Plenty of cheap replacement power was 
available to New England utilities. 
By February 1996, Maine Yankee officials were showing opti­
mism that the comer had been turned. Power production continued. 
The computer code involved in the 1989 uprating had been aban­
doned in favour of a newer model.45 President Frizzle also reposi­
tioned the plant on the whistleblower's charges. In a speech in nearby 
Rockland he observed: 'It seems absurd to many people to have the 
federal government launch such a comprehensive investigation based 
upon an unsigned letter, but I wouldn't want it any other way'46 To a 
newcomer to Maine's nuclear controversies it would have seemed 
that Maine Yankee was pushing an excess of safety on the general 
public. 
Again, the good news was short-lived. In early March, Tzme Maga­
zine featured nuclear power as its cover story for the first time since 
the Three Mile Island accident in 1979.47 This news was no more 
favourable to the nuclear industry. The specific topic of the article 
was whistleblower allegations about the Connecticut Millstone nu­
clear plants. The general message was that the plants and the NRC 
were corruptly sustaining an unsafe industry. 
Release of this article closely coincided with Maine Yankee's re­
port that a leakage of gas at the plant had exposed 18 workers to 
small doses of radiation.48 The NRC filed charges against Maine 
Yankee for failure to follow procedures that should have prevented 
the exposure. Even the Portland Press Herald's editorial suggested 
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that Maine Yankee was risking the 'public confidence' essential for 
its operation.49 A public meeting in Wiscasset revealed considerable 
distrust of the plant and the NRC. 50 
Serious bad news followed in early May with the release of a re­
port by the NRC's Inspector General. 1 5 The neutral watchdog of the 
Commission was sharply critical of aspects of the NRC's regulation 
of Maine Yankee. The NRC 'did not rigorously police' the plant. Its 
documentation was poor. Most pertinent to the anonymous letter were 
'significant indications' that Maine Yankee 'hid problems in a safety­
related computer programme'. The NRC was also characterised as 
too trusting of the plant operators. The NRC had been sharply criti­
cised by its own Inspector General. 
In these circumstances, a Maine-Yankee sponsored review of the 
whistleblower's allegations by a prominent regulatory law firm fell 
on deaf ears.52 The lengthy document concluded that Yankee Atomic 
and Maine Yankee 'might have mistakenly violated federal regula­
tion, but have never misled regulators'. In essence, given the choice 
of an innocent or a culpable explanation the lawyers chose to find 
innocence. One year earlier the report's authors and its length might 
have purchased considerable credibility. In May 1996, it drew mostly 
scorn. The NRC responded that it would rely on its own investiga­
tion. 53 State nuclear official Uldis Vanags suggested: 'This is just one 
side of the story'. 54 Nuclear opponent Bill Linnell dismissed the re­
port as only 'useful as lining for a litter box' .55 
Independent Safety Assessment 
Following the IG Report, the Maine Governor called for a fully in­
dependent, non-NRC, review of the plant preferably by a national 
laboratory or other outside agency. The Governor continued to sug­
gest nuclear power could be used profitably and safely, but Maine 
Yankee needed to get its act together. 6 5
After much negotiation, a team to conduct an Independent Safety 
Assessment (ISA) was assembled in July 1996.57 The federal team 
was a combination of NRC officials and hired contractors. The 22 
members were scientists, engineers and systems analysts with expe­
rience in the nuclear industry. They were joined by three members 
named by the Maine Governor King- the Nuclear Safety Advisor, 
the Nuclear Safety Inspector, and a consultant with expertise in ana­
lysing the operation of energy facilities. They were assigned to teams 
to study operations, maintenance and testing, engineering design and 
technology, management and organisations and the analytical codes. 
The codes investigation, however, would not review the codes in­
volved in the whistle blower investigation, as those were the focus of 
the ongoing 'wrong doing' investigation. 
The ISA team scheduled a rigorous three-month investigation. This 
would include two two-week periods during which the team was on­
site in Wiscasset followed by collegial sessions in Washington. Maine 
Yankee promised its full cooperation. Both the Team leaders and 
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Maine Yankee officials cautioned that such a massive investigation 
was bound to tum up problems. 
Maine Yankee's pattern of embarrassing disclosures continued as 
the ISA moved forward. In early August the press reported the dis­
covery that 'electric cables leading to the steam generators and reac­
tor might not withstand a major accident' .58 This could leave control 
room operators without necessary information on the status of the 
plant. A late August disclosure was even more disturbing. 9 5 Workers 
discovered that a 15-foot section of cable had been cut. While sabo­
tage was possible, it seemed more likely the action had been taken 
for benign reasons but then forgotten. 60 
The ISA report was finally released in early October. The ISA 
statistics were impressive. The team had spent 4,500 man-hours at 
the plant. This was one-third more than the total cumulative annual 
NRC inspection time at Maine Yankee. The team conducted over 
100 interviews and reviewed 100 shelf feet of documents. 61 Assess­
ments of different aspects of the plant were listed as 'superior', 'good' 
or 'adequate'. But the terms were NRC terms with particular NRC 
meanings. As a team leader commented, 'good isn't something to be 
proud of'. There was no category for 'unsatisfactory'; plants deemed 
unsatisfactory were plants not permitted to operate. 
The ISA did not call for closure of the plant. There were positive 
reports in several areas. But the Report also identified serious short­
comings and troubling trends. The plant was 'generally in conform­
ance with the licensing and design basis'. However, the old Maine 
Yankee plant lacked the specificity of newer plants. The design basis 
supported operation at 2440 Mw,h. But operation at 2700 was 'not 
demonstrated'. 
Some of the significant problems surfaced in the review of opera­
tions. Most were discovered by team members and had evidently 
been overlooked or ignored by Maine Yankee prior to 1996. A tell­
ing statistic was that the infamous cut wire provided a six per cent 
increase in risk. Operations were also hampered by the cost-driven 
temptation to rely on 'work arounds', to continue operation without 
fixing the root problem. As one team member phrased it, the 'gener­
ate cheap' mentality was deeply ingrained. 
Testing and engineering also came in for serious criticism. The 
lack of a questioning attitude hampered some operations. Other test­
ing simply reflected 'dumb' approaches. Other areas suffered for 
lack of any person with supervisory responsibility. 
The full ISA Report was 100 closely spaced pages. The heart of it 
required significant technical background to understand, let alone 
interpret. For the press and the vast majority of the public, the intro­
duction and the team leader's remarks in the public presentation would 
define the impact of the report. Here, the summary appeared to be an 
average plant safe to continue operation at 2440 Mw,h with 'safety 
deficiencies' and a declining trend. 62 The crucial root cause- why 
had the technical and operational problems arisen- was summed up 
in the finding of'economic pressures to contain costs and poor prob-
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I em identification as a result of complacency and a lack of question­
ing attitude'. 
Legacy of the /SA 
The ISA Report marked a turning point for Maine Yankee. They 
promised to improve. The Board of Directors quickly endorsed a 
63 $10 million expenditure prograrnrne. It also promised management 
changes to address the cultural problems. The NRC reminded every­
one that the Report was only a first step.64 Maine Yankee was ex­
pected to report on its response in two months. The NRC Northwest 
Region Director explained that the Commission expected 'aggres­
65 siveness in identifying and solving' problems. It became clear that 
Maine Yankee faced the serious prospect ofbeing placed on the NRC's 
66 
'watch list,' the strongest evidence of a troubled plant. A sharp drop 
in Central Maine Power's third quarter earnings highlighted the prob­
lem.67 
The ISA report appeared at a troubled time for nuclear power in 
New England and nationally. Shortly before the Report's release the 
Boston Globe, the region's largest newspaper, ran a series on the 
safety and financial troubles of nuclear power in New England.68 
The gloom continued with the speculation of mid-October that the 
Connecticut Yankee plant would close for financial reasons well be­
69 fore the end of its licensed life. And, in mid-October the NRC gave 
all nuclear plants 120 days to verify under oath that they were in 
'compliance with the terms and conditions of your licence and NRC 
regulations.>7° The Maine Yankee experience was helping to set na­
tional policy. 
Dollars and promises were not enough to save Maine Yankee's 
management. Five days before Christmas, a unanimous Maine Yan­
71 kee Board of Directors accepted President Frizzle's resignation. 
On 7 January 1997, the Louisiana-based Entergy Company was 
named as the new Maine Yankee operator.72 Entergy's track record 
of being willing to spend to correct problems struck a responsive 
chord with the Maine Yankee Board. While the Energy appointment 
resulted in some of Maine Yankee's best publicity, it was not without 
criticism. The contract between Entergy and Maine Yankee remained 
73 to be negotiated and was finally signed in February 1997. Both 
supporters and sceptics of nuclear power questioned what incentives 
Entergy would have to make a success of a plant that it did not own. 
Nuclear critics also noted that Entergy had earned a reputation for 
continuing operations while making repairs, a practice good for the 
74 economic bottom-line, but not necessarily for maximum safety.
However high the praise for Entergy, it soon became clear that the 
new management would be tasked with the failings of the old. In late 
January, even before a new CEO arrived in Wiscasset, the NRC placed 
Maine Yankee on the 'watch list'. 75 The plant was placed on the Cat­
egory II list which at least allowed it to return to service while cor­
recting problems. Both opponents and neutral observers, however, 
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sensed that permanent closure might be a realistic prospect. 
In retrospect, events from April to August 1997 showed an inevi­
table movement to closure for Maine Yankee. When events were 
experienced day to day and week to week, however, good news al­
ternated with bad. Certainly the news was not all bad. The overrid­
ing technical threat to Maine Yankee remained the condition of the 
steam generators. A thorough inspection began in March to assess 
76 the premature cracking that had ended the life of other nuclear plants.
A potential $150 million replacement was thought to be too great a 
burden for Maine Yankee management. By May, however, Maine 
Yankee reported that with 80 per cent of the inspection complete, the 
existing generators appeared in good shape. 77 
In May a new prospect emerged in the ever-newsworthy world of 
Maine Yankee - sale of the plant. After a few days of mystery, the 
Peco Corporation (the old Philadelphia Electric Company) identi­
fied itself as interested in the purchase of Maine Yankee from its 
present owners. 78 Peco put forward its case. It was confident that it 
could make existing nuclear plants work safely and at attractive cost 
for the emerging deregulated electricity markets. 
The price and other terms of sale were soon a topic of specula­
tion.79 However, the bargaining positions suddenly took on a very 
different context with the unilateral announcement from Maine Yan­
kee's Board on May 27 that the plant would be closed permanently 
unless a buyer was found. The Board also agreed to cut $41 million 
worth of repair projects and lay off 900 contract employees. Maine 
Yankee CEO Mike Sellman observed: 'Every plant that has decided 
to curtail start-up activities has then gone on and shut down perma­
nently.' 
The following day, the Portland Press Herald summarised the fac­
tors motivating the Board. Repair costs, continued worries about the 
steam generator life, discouraging delays in negotiations with Peco, 
and doubts about Maine Yankee's competitiveness combined to sink 
the plant. Maine Yankee probably could not operate and generate 
power for less than five cents per kilowatt. That would not attract 
customers in a deregulated market. 
All eyes turned to the Peco negotiations. On 7 June the Portland 
Press Herald disclosed 'confidential correspondence' that suggested 
the Maine Yankee-Peco talks were further along and more serious 
than Maine Yankee had first represented. 80 A letter from Peco to Maine 
Yankee spoke of using the next 30 days 'to determine ifthere are any 
conditions which would preclude our taking an ownership position'. 81 
A 28 July Peco Board Meeting became the focal point for a 'go­
no go' decision. The reports from the meeting were favourable. Peco 
executives were given authority to keep negotiating about a purchase. 
A Peco spokesman observed: 'This is a big step forward,' but also 
noted 'significant financial issues still must be resolved' Y 
The cautious optimism of a Monday evaporated that Thursday 
with a call from the Peco CEO to Central Maine Power CEO David 
Flanagan. The message was blunt: 'No sale'. Maine Yankee remained 
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willing 'to pay to have Peco take the plant' but the sticking point
were repair costs and the decommissioning fund. Maine Yankee had
only accumulated about $180 million of an estimated $3 70 million 
needed for decommissioning. And that estimate was widely felt to 
be too low. At the end of the day, the parties were 'tens of millions of
dollars' apart. 83 Early in the following week a 35-minute conference 
call of the Maine Yankee Board admitted defeat with decisions to
close the plant and send a formal notification of the fact to the NRC.84 
One commentator, probably not intending a double meaning, head­
lined its story 'Maine Yankee Closes for Good' .85 
Conclusion 
States and their citizens can remove nuclear power from their bor­
ders if they rely on non-safety reasons. In the case of Maine Yankee, 
the state and federal authorities cooperated in reviewing the plant's 
safety. The NRC ran the ISA. The state both participated and moni­
tored the results. In 1996 both the NRC and the state found their
interests advanced by discoveries of significant safety concerns and 
a general attitude oflaxity on the part of the plant. The NRC needed 
to revalidate its reputation. A finding of only trivial shortcomings 
would not have been believed by the state, by the anti-nuclear com­
munity, or by the public at large. 
The end result of the Federal-State collaboration involving Maine 
Yankee may be viewed that the operation was successful but the pa­
tient died. But the alternative of a Maine Yankee continuing to the 
end of its licensed life with major uncorrected safety defects is far 
more troubling. The message for other nuclear facilities is that state 
involvement in the federal process can be positive and effective. The 
nuclear plant that cannot meet the rigorous review of such a joint 
team should not operate. The ones that can may have a future in the 
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